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Abstract 
Share prices of financial companies from the S&P 500 list have been modeled by a linear function of consumer price 
indices in the USA. The Johansen and Engle-Granger tests for cointegration both demonstrated the presence of an 
equilibrium long-term relation between observed and predicted time series. Econometrically, the pricing concept is 
valid. For several companies, share prices are defined only by CPI readings in the past.  Therefore, our empirical pricing 
model is a deterministic one. For a few companies, including Lehman Brothers, AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
negative share prices could be foreseen in May-September 2008. One might interpret the negative share prices as a sign 
of approaching bankruptcies.  
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Introduction 
Recently, we have developed and tested statistically and econometrically a deterministic model 
predicting share prices of selected S&P 500 companies (Kitov, 2010).  We have found that there 
exists a linear link between various subcategories of consumer price index (CPI) and some share 
prices, with the latter lagging by several months. In order to build a reliable quantitative model from 
this link one needs to use standard and simple statistical procedures.  
Following the general concept and principal results of the previous study, here we are 
predicting stock prices of financial companies from the S&P 500 list. In several cases, robust 
predictions are obtained at a time horizon of several months. In close relation to these financial 
companies we have also investigated several cases of bankruptcy and bailout. These cases include 
Lehman Brothers (LH), American International Group (AIG), Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac 
(FRE).  Regarding these bankruptcies, we have tested our model against its predictive power in 
May and September 2008. The main question was:  Could the bankruptcies be foreseen? If yes, 
which companies should or should not be bailed out as related to the size of their debt?  
In the mainstream economics and finances stock prices are treated as not predictable beyond 
their stochastic properties.  The existence of a deterministic model would undermine the 
fundamental assumption of the stock market. If the prices are predictable, the participants would 
have not been actively defining new prices in myriads of tries, but blindly followed the driving 
force behind the market. It is more comfortable to presume that all available information is already 
counted in. However, our study has demonstrated that the stochastic market does not mean an 
unpredictable one.  
In this paper, we analyze sixty six financial companies from the S&P 500 lists as of January 
2010 as well as a few bankrupts from the financials. Some of the companies have been accurately 
described by models including two CPI subcategories leading relevant share prices by several 
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months. Other companies are characterized by models with at least one of defining CPI components 
lagging behind related stock prices. We have intentionally constrained our investigation to S&P 500 
- we expect other companies to be described by similar models.  
Our deterministic model for the evolution of stock prices is based on a “mechanical” 
dependence on the CPI.  Under our framework, the term “mechanical” has multiple meanings. 
Firstly, it expresses mechanistic character of the link when any change in the CPI is one-to-one 
converted into the change in related stock prices, as one would expect with blocks or leverages. 
Secondly, the link does not depend on human beings in sense of their rational or irrational behavior 
or expectations. In its ultimate form, the macroeconomic concept behind the stock price model 
relates the market prices to populations or the numbers of people in various age groups irrelevant to 
their skills. Accordingly, the populations consist of the simplest possible objects; only their 
numbers matter. Thirdly, the link is a linear one, i.e. the one often met in classical mechanics. In all 
these regards, we consider the model as a mechanical one and thus a physical one rather than an 
economic or financial one. Essentially, we work with measured numbers not with the piles of 
information behind any stock. 
For the selected stocks, the model quantitatively foresees at a several month horizon. 
Therefore, there exist two or more CPI components unambiguously defining share prices several 
months ahead. It is worth noting that the evolution of all CPI components is likely to be defined, in 
part, by stochastic forces. According to the mechanical dependence between the share prices and the 
CPI, all stochastic features are one-to-one converted into stochastic behavior of share prices. Since 
the prices lag behind the CPI, this stochastic behavior is fully predetermined. The predictability of a 
measured variable using independent measured variables, as described by mathematical 
relationships, is one of the principal requirements for a science to join the club of hard sciences. 
Therefore, our stock pricing model indicates that the stock market is likely an object of a hard 
science. 
A model predicting stock prices in a deterministic way is a sensitive issue. It seems unfair to 
give advantages to randomly selected market participants. As thoroughly discussed in (Kitov, 
2009b; Kitov and Kitov, 2008; 2009ab) the models are piecewise ones. A given set of empirical 
coefficients holds until the trend in the difference between defining CPI is sustained. Such 
sustainable trends are observed in a majority of CPI differences and usually last between 5 and 20 
years (Kitov and Kitov, 2008). The most recent trend has been reaching its natural end since 2008 
and the transition to a new trend in 2009 and 2010 is likely the best time to present our model. As a 
result, there is no gain from the empirical models discussed in this paper. Their predictive power 
has been fading away since 2008. When the new trend in the CPI is established, one will be able to 
estimate new empirical coefficients, all participants having equal chances.  
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The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 1 introduces the model and data, 
which include stock prices of sixty six S&P 500 financial companies and seventy CPI components. 
In Section 2, empirical models are presented both in tabulated and graphical forms. For each model 
we have estimated standard deviation, which serves as a proxy to the model accuracy. For a few 
companies, the estimated models are robust over the previous 10 months. Section 3 tests these 
models statistically and econometrically. The Johansen (1988) and Engle-Granger (Newbold and 
Granger, 1967; Hendry and, Juselius, 2001) tests both demonstrate that the null hypothesis of the 
existence a cointegrating relation between the observed and predicted time series cannot be rejected 
for a majority of companies. Therefore, the model is justified econometrically, and thus, all 
statistical inferences are valid. In Section 4, a crucial historical problem is addressed: Could one 
predict in May 2008 the evolution of financial stock prices? For some companies, the models 
estimated in the beginning of 2008 hold over the next year. Hence, the empirical modeling would 
have allowed accurate prediction of the evolution of stock prices, including those related to 
companies who filed for bankruptcy in several months.  Finally, Section 5 investigates several cases 
of bankruptcy and bailout in the United States. It is found that many stock price trajectories would 
have been predicted to dive below the zero line. 
The results of the presented research open a new field for the future investigations of the stock 
market. We do not consider the concept and empirical models as accurate enough or final. There 
should be numerous opportunities to amend and elaborate the model. Apparently, one can include 
new and improve available estimates of consumer price indices.   
 
1. Model and data 
Kitov (2009b) introduced a simple deterministic pricing model. Originally, it was based on an 
assumption that there exists a linear link between a share price (here only the stock market in the 
United States is considered) and the differences between various expenditure subcategories of the 
headline CPI. The intuition behind the model was simple - a higher relative rate of price growth 
(fall) in a given subcategory of goods and services is likely to result in a faster increase (decrease) 
in stock prices of related companies. In the first approximation, the deviation between price-
defining indices is proportional to the ratio of their pricing powers.  The presence of sustainable 
(linear or nonlinear) trends in the differences, as described in (Kitov and Kitov, 2008; 2009ab), 
allows predicting the evolution of the differences, and thus, the deviation between prices of 
corresponding goods and services. The trends are the basis of a long-term prediction of share prices. 
In the short-run, deterministic forecasting is possible only in the case when a given price lags 
behind defining CPI components.   
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In its general form, the pricing model is as follows (Kitov, 2010): 
 
sp(tj) = Σbi·CPIi(tj-τi) + c·(tj-2000 ) + d + ej                               (1) 
 
where sp(tj) is the share price at discrete (calendar) times tj, j=1,…,J; CPIi(tj-τi) is the i-th 
component of the CPI with the time lag τi, i=1,..,I; bi, c and d  are empirical coefficients of the 
linear and constant term; ej is the residual error, which statistical properties have to be scrutinized. 
By definition, the bets-fit model minimizes the RMS residual error. The time lags are expected 
because of the delay between the change in one price (stock or goods and services) and the reaction 
of related prices. It is a fundamental feature of the model that the lags in (1) may be both negative 
and positive. In this study, we limit the largest lag to fourteen months. Apparently, this is an 
artificial limitation and might be changed in a more elaborated model. In any case, a fourteen-
month lag seems to be long enough for a price signal to pass through.  
System (1) contains J equations for I+2 coefficients. Since the sustainable trends last more 
than five years, the share price time series have more than 60 points. For the current recent trend, 
the involved series are between 70 and 90 readings. Due to the negative effects of a larger set of 
defining CPI components discussed by Kitov (2010), their number for all models is (I=) 2. To 
resolve the system, we use standard methods of matrix inversion. As a rule, solutions of (1) are 
stable with all coefficients far from zero. 
At the initial stage of our investigation, we do not constraint the set of CPI components in 
number or/and content. Kitov (2010) used only 34 components selected from the full set provided 
by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010). To some extent, the original choice was random with 
many components to be similar. For example, we included the index of food and beverages and the 
index for food without beverages. When the model resolution was low, defining CPI components 
were swapping between neighbors.     
For the sake of completeness we always retain all principal subcategories of goods and 
services. Among them are the headline CPI (C), the core CPI, i.e. the headline CPI less food and 
energy (CC), the index of food and beverages (F), housing (H), apparel (A), transportation (T), 
medical care (M), recreation (R), education and communication (EC), and other goods and services 
(O). The involved CPI components are listed in Appendix 1. They are not seasonally adjusted 
indices and were retrieved from the database provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010). 
Many indices were started as late as 1998. It was natural to limit our modeling to the period 
between 2000 and 2010, i.e. to the current long-term trend.   
Since the number and diversity of CPI subcategories is a crucial parameter, we have extended 
the set defining components to 70 from the previous set of 34 components.  As demonstrated below, 
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the extended set has provided a significant improvement in the model resolution and accuracy.  
Therefore, we envisage the increase in the number and diversity of defining subcategories as a 
powerful tool for obtaining consistent models. In an ideal situation, any stock should find its 
genuine pair of CPI components. However, the usage of similar components may have a negative 
effect on the model – one may fail to distinguish between very close models.  
 Every sector in the S&P 500 list might give good examples of companies with defining CPI 
components lagging behind relevant stock prices. As of January 2010, there were 66 financial 
companies to model, with the freshest readings being the close (adjusted for dividends and splits) 
prices taken on December 31, 2009. (All relevant share prices were retrieved from 
http://www.finance.yahoo.com.) Some of the modeled companies do present deterministic and 
robust share price models. As before, those S&P 500 companies which started after 2004 are not 
included.  In addition, we have modeled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are not in the S&P 
500 list, and Lehman Brothers and CIT Group (CIT) which are out of the S&P 500 list. Due to the 
fact that the latter three companies are both bankrupts, they have been modeled over the period of 
their existence. Apparently, there are many more bankrupts to be modeled in the future.  
There are two sources of uncertainty associated with the difference between observed and 
predicted prices, as discussed by Kitov (2010). First, we have taken the monthly close prices 
(adjusted for splits and dividends) from a large number of recorded prices: monthly and daily open, 
close, high, and low prices, their combinations as well as averaged prices. Without loss of 
generality, one can randomly select for modeling purposes any of these prices for a given month. 
By chance, we have selected the closing price of the last working day for a given month. The larger 
is the fluctuation of a given stock price within and over the months the higher is the uncertainty 
associated with the monthly closing price as a representative of the stock price.  
Second source of uncertainty is related to all kinds of measurement errors and intrinsic 
stochastic properties of the CPI. One should also bear in mind all uncertainties associated with the 
CPI definition based on a fixed basket of goods and services, which prices are tracked in few 
selected places.  Such measurement errors are directly mapped into the model residual errors. Both 
uncertainties, as related to stocks and CPI, also fluctuate from month to month. 
 
2. Modeling financial companies 
The results of modeling are presented in Table 1 and Appendix 2: two defining components with 
coefficients and lags, linear trend and free terms, and the standard error, σ, expressed in dollars. 
Negative lags, which correspond to leading share prices, are shown in bold.  Figure 1 and Appendix 
3 depict the observed and predicted curves. Five companies will be studied in more detail in Section 
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5: American International Group, Citigroup (C), Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB), Legg Mason Inc. 
(LM), Moody’s Corporation (MCO) and Morgan Stanley (MS).  
Some financial companies have at least one defining CPI component lagging behind relevant 
stock price. For these companies, it is better to use the term “decomposition into” instead of 
“defining” CPI components.  For example, share price of Aflac Incorporated (AFL) is defined by 
the index of financial services (FS) and that of transportation services (TS), the former lagging 2 
months behind the share price and the latter leading by 6 months.  Coefficient b1 is positive. It 
means that the higher is the price for financial services the larger is the AFL’s share price. The 
effect of the price index of transpiration services is opposite. Standard error for the model for the 
period between July 2003 and December 2009 is only $3.71.  Figure 1 displays the observed and 
predicted prices for the period between 2003 and 2010. Before July 2003, the model does not hold 
and the curves deviate. Otherwise both curves are is a relatively good agreement including the sharp 
drop in 2008. From the statistical point of view, this is a key feature because any increase in the 
range of total change in the price and the defining CPIs is directly converted into higher model 
resolution.   
Overall, standard errors in Table 1 and Appendix 2 vary from $0.77 for People’s United 
Financial Inc. (PBCT) to ~$92 for AIG, which will be thoroughly analyzed in Section 5. When 
normalized to the stock prices averaged over the whole period, the standard errors fluctuate less. 
However, for non-stationary time series with measurement errors dependent on amplitude the 
normalized errors are likely biased. The predicted curve is Figure 1 is very close to the observed 
one and foresees one month ahead. Actually, the predicted curve leads the observed one by one 
month. 
American International Group was the first company bailed out by the US financial 
authorities in September 2008.  This action introduced a bias into the link between AIG share price 
and defining CPIs, which existed before September 2008. The model listed in Table 1 is likely to be 
inappropriate as related to the link and not a robust one. The defining CPIs for the December 2009 
model are as follows: the index for food away from home (SEFV) leading by 1 month and the index 
of prescribed drugs (PDRUG) leading by 13 months. In Section 5, we investigate the evolution of 
the bet-fit model from May 2008 to December 2009.  
The model for Apartment Investment and Management Company (AIV) has both defining 
CPIs leading the share price: the index of pets and pet related products (PETS), a subcategory of the 
index for recreation,  leads by one month and the index of prescribed drugs (PDRUG) is five 
months ahead of the price. At first glance, this set of defining CPIs does not look convincing. This 
might be an effect of the changing trend in the CPI. Before November 2009, the best-fit model 
included the index of food and beverages (F) and the PDRUG, both leading by 8 months. This set 
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determined the best-fit model during the 12 previous months (Kitov, 2010).  In the smaller set of 34 
CPI components used by Kitov (2010), the index of food and beverages and that of medical care 
(M) were the driving ones between November 2008 and October 2009 and provided the standard 
error of $2.058, but for a shorter period. With the PDRUG, the standard error for the same period 
between July 2003 and October 2009 is $2.055, i.e. only marginally better. This fact demonstrates 
how sensitive the model is to the defining CPIs.  When more components are included, one could 
expect changes in the previously obtained models and lower standard errors.  
The Allstate Corporation (ALL) has a model with both defining CPIs leading the share price. 
This model is unstable, however, and minimizes the RMS error only for the period between July 
2003 and December 2009. In 2009, one of two defining components was randomly changing and 
one, the index for food away from home (SEFV), fixed. It is likely that the current set of defining 
CPIs do not include the one related to ALL. Thus, further investigations are needed.  
Table 1. Empirical 2-C models for selected S&P 500 financial companies 
 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d σ, $ 
AFL 0.59 FS -2 -2.37 TS 6 12.12 349.73 3.71 
AIG -191.36 SEFV 1 38.53 PDRUG 13 727.81 21116.78 92.3 
AIV -1.64 PETS 1 1.09 PDRUG 5 -1.61 -139.18 2.15 
ALL 0.07 E 11 -6.86 SEFV 2 45.20 1106.19 2.82 
AVB 0.57 CM 1 1.92 AB -1 -12.01 -345.48 1.36 
AXP -3.81 F 4 -2.00 M 10 49.93 1115.79 2.48 
BAC -2.95 FB 3 -2.97 SEFV 13 35.43 956.52 2.53 
BBT -1.57 F 3 -0.31 FRUI 13 12.58 332.95 2.06 
BEN -7.95 FB 3 6.59 VAA 13 60.58 564.48 6.46 
BK -0.69 MEAT 13 -1.65 PETS 1 15.80 270.32 2.09 
BXP 4.58 MCC 5 -5.04 PETS 3 5.63 -605.31 5.04 
C 2.54 HO 5 -8.26 SEFV 2 36.70 1048.90 2.53 
FITB -4.85 SEFV 2 1.45 HS 6 21.19 621.56 1.82 
HBAN -2.15 RPR 13 1.32 FOTO 13 17.23 252.80 0.93 
HCN -1.80 PETS 2 0.76 HOSP 5 -7.06 -40.40 2.20 
GS 21.06 HO 10 -29.45 SEFV 3 111.40 2496.20 13.48 
JPM -2.49 F 4 3.19 ORG 0 26.31 139.00 2.49 
L -2.49 FB 5 -1.51 TS 3 28.35 679.85 2.07 
LM -6.01 F 4 -8.17 APL 13 33.07 1754.81 6.89 
PNC 1.49 CM 0 -3.44 FB 4 16.37 331.72 3.49 
PSA -4.14 SEFV 3 2.04 PDRUG 5 14.25 72.98 4.43 
VNO -11.08 SEFV 3 2.23 PDRUG 5 57.23 1113.14 5.30 
 
Avalonbay Communities (AVB) has a model with one defining index (alcoholic beverages, 
AB) lagging behind the price by one month and the headline CPI less medical care (CM) leading by 
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one month.    This model is very stable over the previous 10 months and has a standard error of 
$1.36.   
American Express Company (AXP) has a model predicting at a four month horizon. The 
defining CPIs are the index for food and beverages leading by 4 months and the index for medical 
care leading by 10 months. In the previous study (Kitov, 2010) the model was essentially the same. 
So, the extended CPI set does not make a better model. The model is a robust one and minimizes 
the standard error for the period between July and November 2009 as well. 
The model for Bank of America (BAC) is defined by the index of food and that of food away 
from home. The latter CPI component leads by 13 months. From our past experience, the larger is 
the lag the more unreliable is the model. However, both defining components provide the best fit 
model in the second half of 2009.   Both coefficients in the BAC model are negative. This means 
that increasing food price forces the share price down. The growth in the indices of food and food 
away from home has been compensated by linear time trend in the share price.   
Franklin Resources (BEN) is driven by the index of food (FB) and that of video and audio 
(VAA), both leading by several months. The former component has a negative coefficient and the 
latter one – positive. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (BK) is defined by the index of meats, 
poultry and fist (MEAT) and the index of pets and per related products, both having negative 
coefficients. The model has a standard error of $2.09.  
Boston Properties (BXP) has a model with the index of medical care commodities (MCC) and 
PETS leading by 5 and 3 months, respectively. This is a relatively stable model. However, the best-
fit model was different before September 2009 and included the index of food and the index of 
miscellaneous services (MISS). This model had been reining since March 2009.  The model 
obtained in (Kitov, 2010) was based on the CPI less energy (CE) and the index of food. It was a 
mediocre model with the RMS error of $5.54 compared to $5.11 obtained in this study for the same 
period. 
Citigroup is of special interest. This company was bailed out in November 2008. For the 
purposes of share modeling the bailout introduces a major disturbance, because the share is not the 
one estimated by the free stock market any more.  Accordingly, the models obtained after 
November 2008 are likely to be biased. In Table 1, a share of Citigroup is defined by the index of 
household operations (HO) and that of food away from home (SEFV). Coefficient b1 (=+2.54) is 
positive and the increase in HO should be converted into a higher share price. The effect of SEFV is 
an opposite one with a larger coefficient b2=-8.26. In 2007 and 2008, the index of household 
operations was increasing at almost the same rate as the SEFV, and the share fell from $50 in April 
2007 to $1.5 in January 2009.   
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The next ten companies in Table 1 are all robust and have deterministic price models with no 
one of defining indexes lagging. Huntington Bancshares (HBAN) is controlled by the index of 
primary residence rent (RPR) and the index for photography (FOTO), both leading by 13 months. 
This model holds at least over the 10 months previous to December 2009. Coefficient b1   is 
negative and any increase in RPR is converted into a decrease in the HBAN share price 13 months 
later. It is instructive to track this model in 2010. It must be fading away with the transition to a new 
trend in the CPI.  The model standard deviation is only $0.92 for the whole period. Figure 1 
displays relevant curves.  Except four of five points, the agreement is excellent.  
Health Care REIT (HCN) has a model defined by the PETS and the index of hospital services 
(HOSP). The latter has a permanent positive trend and likely is compensated by the linear trend 
term with a negative slope (-40.4). The predicted and observed curves are very close. So, the model 
accurately predicts at a two-month horizon.  
Goldman Sachs (GS) is a famous bank. The trajectory of its share price is well predicted by 
the index of household operations (HO) and the index of food away from home (SEFV) at a three 
month horizon. Since coefficient b1 is positive the decreasing price index of household operations 
results in a fall in GS share price, as was observed in 2008 and 2009.  In the second half of 2009, 
the price was on rise.  
JPMorgan Chase & Co. is defined by food and beverages (F) and other recreation goods 
(ORG). Since the time lag of the ORG is zero the model can predict only contemporary share price. 
In Figure 1, the observed and predicted curves almost coincide before 2007.  The years between 
2007 and 2009 are characterized by extremely high fluctuations in the observed price. The model 
failed to predict this feature. In 2009, the prediction is good again, however. Therefore, the 
fluctuations are likely to be related to short-term forces not affecting fundamental long-term link 
between the price and the defining CPIs.  
The best-fit model for Loews Corporation (L) includes the index of food (FB) leading by 5 
months and the index of transportation services (TS) leading by 3 months. Both coefficients are 
negative and are counteracted by a positive slope c=28.35. The model for Legg Mason (LM) is 
based on the index of food and beverages and the index of appliances (APL) from the housing 
index, the latter leading by 13 months. Overall, the predicted time series is very close to the 
observed one with standard deviation of $6.89. The largest input to the standard deviation comes 
from a short period in 2006. Otherwise, both curves are very close even during the dramatic fall 
from $80 per share in the end of 2007 to $10 per share in February 2009 and during the fast 
recovery in 2009.  
PNC Financial Services (PNC) relies on the headline CPI less medical care (CM) and the 
index of food (FB), the model being a contemporary to the share. Public Storage (PSA) and 
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Vornado Realty Trust have similar models defined by the index of food away from home and the 
PDRUG. The time lags are also identical and are 3 and 5 months, respectively. Figure 1 
demonstrates that the observed prices of PCA and VNO are similar with a local peak in the first half 
of 2008. A similar pattern is observed for AIV, which model also includes PDRUG. The difference 
between PCA and VNO is in the sensitivity to SEFV: b1(PSA)=-4.14  and b1(VNO)=-11.08.   
So, among the models with both defining CPIs leading relevant shares, there are examples of 
robust models and unstable models. For the latter companies, no fixed model is available over the 
past year.  It is likely that these models express the lack of true defining indices in the current set of 
CPIs and are affected by random measurement noise. One cannot exclude that true robust models 
do exists for these companies.  
For other forty four financial companies relevant models and graphs are presented in 
Appendices 2 and 3. These models use quiet several defining CPIs not mentioned in Table 1. 
Otherwise, Table 1 contains all meaningful configurations of leading and lagging share prices and 
those in the Appendices are given for the sake of completeness.   
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Figure 1.  Observed and predicted share prices of eight financial companies from the S&P 500 list. 
Relevant empirical models are presented in Table 1.  
 
The principal purpose of Section 2 consists in presenting tentative empirical models for share 
prices of financial companies. The current set of defining CPIs is far from a complete one and 
further investigation may reveal more accurate and reliable models for the same companies. 
However, the current models might be good enough because of high correlation between various 
CPI components. For a given share, the currently used CPIs may be very close to the true defining 
CPIs, which are not included in the set yet. Therefore, a direct statistical estimate of the model 
accuracy and reliability is a major task.  
 
3. Cointegration tests 
Statistical properties of the residual error are crucial for any quantitative model. Ideally, a good 
model involving time dependent measured variables should describe the essence of real ties. The 
model residual error should be a stationary (and thus, integrated of order zero) stochastic process 
with characteristics close to the uncorrelated white noise with Gaussian distribution. In the best 
case, residual errors should depend only on measurement errors, with the measurements conducted 
in a consistent way.  
As in the previous study (Kitov, 2010), we applied the Johansen cointegration test to the 
observed time series and those predicted in Section 2. For all studied companies, the test resulted in 
cointegration rank 1 or, for two non-stationary variables, in the presence of one cointegrating 
relation. All results are listed in Table 2. The Johansen approach does not require both variables to 
be in the same order of integration.   
As an alternative, we have applied the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests for unit roots to all residual errors of the models in Table 1, except those with 
defining CPI lagging behind relevant shares. This procedure is in line with the Granger-Engle two-
step method based on several specification tests applied to the residual time series. Having the same 
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econometric power as the Johansen procedure, the Granger-Engle test allows a larger variety of 
specifications.  
 
Table 2. Results of Johansen cointegration test and unit root tests as applied to the residual errors 
 
 ADF PP  Johansen test   
 z(t), 1%CV1=-3.54 z(ρ), 1%CV=-19.4 eigenvalue trace statistics,  
5%CV=3.76 
rank 
AIG -4.10 -29.8 0.21 0.24 1 
AIV -6.19 -47.5 0.35 0.15 1 
ALL -5.95 -46.5 0.32 0.04 1 
AXP -4.98 -38.3 0.25 0.35 1 
BAC -4.87 -38.5 0.21 0.003 1 
BBT -5.96 -47.7 0.29 0.08 1 
BEN -4.53 -34.0 0.22 1.90 1 
BK -5.00 -40.0 0.26 0.07 1 
BXP -5.47 -39.6 0.33 0.87 1 
C -5.60 -41.0 0.36 0.27 1 
FITB -5.63 -45.8 0.26 2.39 1 
GS -4.56 -34.0 0.41 1.69 1 
HBAN -5.44 -41.5 0.29 0.29 1 
HCN -5.27 -39.0 0.37 1.91 1 
JPM -6.22 -51.2 0.30 1.15 1 
L -5.70 -43.5 0.37 0.96 1 
LM -4.75 -37.2 0.18 0.11 1 
MS -6.20 -48.4 0.33 0.09 1 
PNC -6.12 -50.0 0.33 0.47 1 
PSA -5.84 -44.3 0.33 2.18 1 
VNO -5.46 -40.0 0.33 0.83 1 
  
1CV – critical value 
  
In a sense, this Section is a fully technical one. We need only a confirmation that the 
regression technique used in Section 2 is applicable, i.e. the regression does not give spurious 
results.  Both tests for cointegration unambiguously evidence the presence of long-term equilibrium 
relations between the actual and predicted prices. The predicted prices can be considered as 
weighted sums of prices for goods and services. In this regard, they are similar to the overall CPI 
and can be considered as independent measurements and represent just one variable. Therefore, one 
does not need to test both defining CPI for cointegration with relevant share price.  
So, one can derive a conclusion that the deterministic pricing model provides a statistically 
and econometrically valid description of share prices of S&P 500 financial companies. There is a 
problem with the model resolution, however. As happens often in physics, in order to obtain a 
consistent and reliable model one should have a wider dynamic range of involved variables or to 
increase the accuracy of measurements. The latter is hardly possible with the past CPI readings. So, 
one could expect a more reliable model for the companies with share prices varying the most.  
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4. May 2008 vs. December 2009 
The current models predicting future prices are of crucial interest for the stock market. It is always 
important to know which stocks will go up/down and at what rate. However, there are significant 
problems related to the past performance of the stock market also to be considered.  One of these 
problems is associated with the 2008/2009 financial and economic crisis, which exposed many 
companies to major risks. Since the late 2007 and very actively since July 2008, stock prices of 
many companies have been decreasing at an accelerating speed. The decrease costs trillions US 
dollars net lost after the overall asset devaluation. This is a natural challenge to our concept: Could 
the model predict the fall in stock prices if available in 2008?   
For all investors and owners it would have been a great relief to predict, and thus, prevent or 
reduce the loss. Here we would like to stress again that the model is valid only when it does not 
disturb natural functioning of the stock market, i.e. those myriads of well-established direct and 
indirect interactions between economic and financial agents. When everybody shifts to one or few 
“salvage” stocks, their behavior becomes highly distorted, biased, and thus unpredictable. A part of 
the financial market is never equivalent to the whole market and this model will be worthless when 
used by all market players.  So, we would not recommend using the model shortly after this book is 
published. In a sense, this publication may destroy the market configuration described by the model.   
The principal question posed in this Section can be addressed quantitatively. As a first step, 
we move back in May 2008 and use contemporary CPI data to obtain the best-fit models for the 
S&P 500 share prices under study.  Table 3 and Appendix 4 list these models obtained for selected 
financial companies. One should bear in mind that the involved prices had only limited dynamic 
range in the beginning of 2008 and corresponding models are not fully resolved. In this sense, the 
2009 models are superior.  
Then, we calculate all share prices using the 2008 models and actual CPI data between May 
2008 and December 2009. In Figure 2 we compare the 2008 predictions to those obtained in 
January 2010 (i.e. the models for December 2009) and described in Section 2. If both models for a 
given share provide similar predictions then the 2008 fall was predictable, at least for the company. 
A few companies in Table 3 have one defining component of the same nature as that in 
relevant December 2009 models. For a majority, both defining indices are different. This effect is 
observed despite our intention to select those 2008 models which provide the best prediction.  
The May 2008 model for ALL, which includes the index of diary products (DIAR) and the 
index of intracity transportation (ITR), predicts the evolution of the share price relatively well till 
July 2009. Then the May prediction starts to diverge at an accelerating rate from the observed 
trajectory. The 2008 trough could be forecasted both in time and amplitude in May 2008.  
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Table 3. Defining CPI components, coefficients and time lags for the models in May 2008.  
     
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d 
AFL 0.36 DIAR 0 -0.55 ITR 12 8.92 38.50 
AIG -21.11 DIAR 9 -172.66 SEFV1 2 1148.11 31872.06 
AIV 1.78 VAA 3 1.23 PDRUG 7 -10.77 -525.90 
ALL 1.85 MCC 7 -2.22 APL 9 -10.18 -207.35 
AVB 1.41 EC 4 1.59 AB 1 -10.47 -340.92 
AXP -7.87 SEFV 4 1.20 HS 6 47.73 1098.50 
BAC -2.72 F 3 1.77 TS 12 8.86 115.22 
BBT -1.98 RPR 13 -1.16 MISS 12 25.57 648.22 
BEN 3.28 PDRUG 12 -1.90 HOSP 3 30.13 -368.96 
BK -1.44 H 11 3.13 HO 11 -2.39 -75.70 
BXP -3.96 F 4 3.17 MCC 7 14.55 -136.73 
C -4.02 FB 8 -4.00 RPR 13 46.97 1376.82 
FITB -0.40 DIAR 7 0.84 PDRUG 8 -12.03 -112.79 
GS 12.87 MVP 5 27.41 FOTO 12 65.74 -4221.10 
HBAN -2.07 SEFV 6 -1.66 RPR 13 22.63 638.78 
HCN 0.20 FU 8 -2.27 VAA 0 1.07 225.28 
HST -2.81 SEFV 3 0.55 PDRUG 7 13.60 290.45 
JPM -2.54 F 4 -0.45 MEAT 13 20.29 484.70 
L 2.02 MVP 5 -5.37 SEFV 5 33.34 643.83 
LM -2.56 MEAT 7 -12.00 APL 13 12.38 1528.90 
PNC 2.43 DUR 10 -5.69 SEFV 4 43.97 617.15 
PSA 6.13 MVP 5 -9.54 RPR 6 57.57 1103.99 
VNO 2.63 PDRUG 7 8.56 FOTO 10 10.67 -1683.89 
1 same defining CPIs as in Table 1 are highlighted.  
 
For several companies, the agreement between the May 2008 and December 2009 predictions 
does not disappear even when models are different. For example, the 2008 model for AXP, defined 
by the SEFV and the index of household services (HS), does not diverge from the observed 
trajectory since 2008.  Similar situation is observed with the model for Host Hotels&Resorts (HST). 
This effect shows the necessity of a complete or at least more representative set of CPIs. Otherwise, 
one can not distinguish between two neighboring models with defining CPI components 
characterized by a high degree of correlation.   
 The 2008 and 2010 models for BXP have one common defining variable – the index of 
medical care commodities (MCC). Nevertheless, the 2008 model fails to predict the future 
trajectory well. This is due to the difference between the indices for food and beverages and pets. 
Similar effect is observed with JPM. 
The 2008 model for GS demonstrates a striking difference with the observed time series. It 
predicted the fall in the share price down to the zero line in the second half of 2009. In reality, no 
catastrophic drop happened and the price fell only to the level of $70. From the actual time series it 
is clear that the model for GS could not be well resolved because of very limited change in the share 
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price by May 2008.  There are several financial companies with shares predicted to fall below the 
zero. Some predictions were accurate enough. These companies are modeled in Section 5.  
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Figure 2. Comparison of stock prices predicted in May 2008 and December 2009. 
 
The number of successful models is relatively small if to consider the initial set of S&P 500 
companies. This fact raises delicate questions about the reliability of the models and the concept 
itself. One may assume that the successful models are just a lucky accident. The concept should be 
validated by modeling of more companies, extension of the set of defining CPI components, and 
usage of new data in the years to come.    
We also take into account the fact that quantitative models, also in physics, are better resolved 
than all involved variables vary in wider ranges. Specifically, the difference between the 2008 and 
2009 models consists in the sharp fall after July 2008. Therefore, the models obtained in 2009 are 
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better resolved and thus superior to those from 2008. Data available in 2008 did not allow 
identification of right models because of high correlation between subcategories of the consumer 
price index. Good news is that the right models hold once and for all, but with new coefficients. 
 
5. Predicting bankruptcy 
In Section 4, we have modeled the evolution of share prices of several financial companies from the 
S&P 500 list between May 2008 and December 2009. It was found that some predicted share prices 
sank below the zero line. Under our framework, the presence of a negative stock price may be 
considered as an equivalent to a net debt. When long enough and without any positive prospective, 
such a debt would likely result in a bankruptcy.   
In reality, some companies with negative predicted share prices declared bankruptcy, some 
were bailed out and some have been suffering tremendous difficulties since 2008. The first group is 
represented by Lehman Brothers who filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 
2008. The net bank debt was estimated at the level of $600 billion.  More than 100 banks filed for 
bankruptcy since then.  
Several banks were bailed out, with American International Group the first to obtain a $150 
billion government bailout.  The AIG bailout was presented as a major move to save the collapsing  
US financial system.  The biggest examples of bailout are also Fannie May and Freddie Mac. All 
three companies had a sharp share price fall in the second half of 2008.  
CIT Group Inc. (CIT) got $2.3 billion of bailout money in December 2008 and $3 billion 
bond holder bailout in July 2009. However, it did not help and CIT declared bankruptcy in 
November 2009. These companies and many others have been struggling and likely will struggle in 
the future trying to restructure their debts and re-enter the stock market.   
Section 5 seeks to answer a number of questions: 
• Was it possible to predict the evolution of total debt of the bankrupts?  
• Was it possible to predict the dates of these bankruptcies?  
• Is it possible to predict the date of recovery?  
• It is possible to predict future bankruptcies?  
• Which company had to be bailed out and when?  
 
All S&P 500 models with negative share prices were obtained together with other models for 
May 2008. In this regard we should not distinguish them. The reason for a separate investigation 
consists in the fact that negative share prices might result in bankruptcies. This is a phenomenon no 
described quantitatively by our models and thus deserving special attention. Otherwise, all models 
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were equivalent and obtained according to the same procedures. It is worth noting that the models 
for the same companies obtained in October 2009 are highly biased by bailouts or do not exist 
together with bankrupt companies.  
 
Table 4. Models for 10 companies: May, September and December 2008, and October 2009.  
May 2008 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d 
AIG -21.11 DIAR 9 -172.66 SEFV 2 1148.11 31872 
C -4.33 FB 4 -3.63 RPR 12 46.79 1358 
CIT -4.84 F 5 11.51 SEFV 6 96.99 2610 
FITB 1.46 MCC 9 -0.32 DIAR 8 13.01 227.5 
FNM 9.62 RS 3 10.84 SEFV 6 24.36 733.0 
FRE -3.54 DUR 2 -9.66 RPR 13 57.75 2180 
LEH -6.27 FB 4 -1.38 HOSP 3 77.60 1411 
LM -2.57 MEAT 7 -12.02 APL 13 12.40 1532 
MCO -5.50 F 5 -5.83 RPR 9 75.37 1909 
MS 7.788 R 7 -0.85 DIAR 4 1.49 -658.8 
 
September 2008 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d 
AIG -22.10 DIAR 9 -178.42 SEFV 1 1198 32967 
C -4.26 FB 9 -3.62 RPR 12 46.39 1345 
CIT -0.77 DAIR 8 -8.20 RPR 11 59.95 1584 
FITB -3.07 F 12 1.06 PDRUG 8 -0.97 250.50 
FNM -15.39 SEFV 10 4.64 HS 6 68.38 1937.7 
FRE -1.14 COMM 0 -14.11 SEFV 5 90.59 2433 
LEH -7.37 FB 4 -5.29 MISS 2 102.3 2477.7 
LM -2.62 MEAT 7 -12.20 APL 13 12.46 1558 
MCO 3.28 DUR 9 -9.26 RPR 9 72.78 1237.5 
MS -0.42 TPU 0 -0.95 DIAR 4 12.95 235.2 
 
December 2008 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d 
AIG 
-22.34 DIAR 9 -173.7 SEFV 1 1169 32260 
C 
-3.74 FB 9 -3.76 RPR 13 44.39 1287.6 
CIT 2.60 NC 12 -9.66 RPR 13 63.46 1375 
FITB 
-3.48 F 7 -0.93 LS 11 23.20 781.5 
FNM 
-5.67 F 8 -2.28 TS 0 35.61 1436 
FRE 
-2.21 TS 0 -8.40 RPR 13 62.87 1976.6 
LEH 
-5.21 F 5 -4.97 PETS 0 59.65 1323 
LM 
-7.27 F 5 -8.31 APL 13 39.48 1967.8 
MCO 2.98 DUR 9 -9.70 RPR 10 74.58 1350 
MS 
-12.55 SEFV 3 2.83 HS 10 74.88 1589 
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October 2009 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d 
AIG 
-22.79 DIAR 9 -156.05 SEFV 0 1066 29580 
C 
-0.59 DIAR 4 -5.88 SEFV 5 38.84 1054.8 
CIT 4.92 HFO 10 -9.37 RPR 12 62.02 1058 
FITB 
-4.99 SEFV 2 1.54 HS 6 21.86 630.7 
FNM 
-15.39 SEFV 10 4.64 HS 6 68.38 1837.7 
FRE 
-1.13 COMM 0 -14.12 SEFV 5 90.59 2433.8 
LEH 
-7.39 FB 4 -5.29 MISS 2 102.3 2477.7 
LM 
-5.82 FB 4 -8.18 APL 13 32.36 1722 
MCO 
-12.98 RPR 10 3.19 MISG 8 97.83 1981 
MS 5.16 HO 10 -9.61 SEFV 3 39.62 1017 
 
Table 4 lists 10 models with predicted negative or very close to negative prices as obtained in 
May, September and December 2008 as well as in October 2009.  Figure 3 displays corresponding 
predicted and observed curves between July 2003 and December 2009.  American International 
Group has a very stable model for the entire period as defined by the DIAR and SEFV. 
Theoretically, the company should suffer a rapid drop in share price from ~$1400 to the level of 
about -$300. In reality, this fall was stopped by a bailout with the share price hovering between $10 
and $50 by the end of 2008 and through 2009. According to all four models the price should start 
growing in 2010. It will be an important test for our pricing concept.  
For Citigroup, the models obtained in 2008 are similar and are based on the indices of food 
and rent of primary residence. Figure 3 demonstrate that negative prices were expected in the end of 
2008. All three models predicted the bottom price at -$30. In October 2009, the defining CPI 
components are different as the model tries to describe the price near $2.   
The history of CIT Group (CIT) includes two attempts of bailout and a bankruptcy in 
November 2009 with a total debt of $10 billion. In Figure 3, the May 2008 model predicts a very 
deep fall in the share price. Other two models in 2008 demonstrate just a modest fall below the zero 
line. The bailouts have likely biased the October 2009 model and it predicts the company to recover 
in 2010.  It would be a good exercise similar to that for the AIG model. Unfortunately, the history 
of CIT Group has ended with a bankruptcy, as expected.  
Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac were both bailed out in September 2008. As depicts Figure 3, the 
models between May and December 2008 are all different. However, all of them predicted negative 
prices. The models for FNM imply the bottom price level of -$50 to -$60 and the pivot point 
somewhere in 2009. The models for FRE do predict negative prices with the bottom at -$30, but 
only the September model has a pivot point.    
Lehman Brothers was one of the first giant companies to file for bankruptcy protection in 
September 2008.  The May 2009 model does predict negative prices in the beginning of 2009. The 
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September and December 2009 models are likely biased by the bankruptcy but both indicate a deep 
fall in the price. It is important to stress that the bottom price for LEH was predicted at -$20 with a 
quick return into the positive zone.  Therefore, the risk might be overestimated.  
The models predicted for FITB, LM, MCO and MS are presented to emphasize the problem of 
resolution and selection of a valid model. For these four companies there is at least one model 
predicting negative or very close to zero prices. In reality, no one of them has touched the zero line. 
Moreover, they have not been falling since the end of 2008.  So, in order to obtain an accurate 
prediction one should the best resolution, which might be guaranteed by the higher possible 
dynamic range. The 2008 crisis and the following recovery allowed the biggest change in the S&P 
share prices. Hence, the models obtained in 2010 have to be the most resolved and thus the most 
reliable.  Good news is that these models will be valid in the future, but with different coefficients 
(Kitov, 2010). 
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Figure 3. Comparison of stock prices for several financial companies as predicted in May, 
September and December 2008, and October 2009 
 
There are six companies, all with predicted negative prices but different fate.  We have a 
question on relative merits of the previous bank bailouts - which bank did deserve a bailout and 
how much would it really cost? The models in Table 4, although they are only tentative ones and 
should be used with all necessary precautions, might provide a measure of debt size. One can 
estimate the debt as a product of the number of shares and relevant market price, which was 
negative for the bailed out and not bailed out companies. Table 5 lists the estimated debts. Lehman 
Brothers had a much smaller debt than that of Citigroup, CIT and AIG. So, it would have been 
much easier to bail out LEH from the mathematical point of view. Also, the joint debt of AIG, FRE 
and FNM is less than $200 billion.  
So, we have answered all questions formulated in the beginning of this Section. When having 
valid pricing models for the companies under consideration, one could foresee all problems before 
they become serious and select appropriate measures including bailouts.  Moreover, taking into 
account the deterministic evolution of the CPI and linear trends in the CPI differences (Kitov and 
Kitov, 2008), one could predict major problems long before they happen and avoid most of the 
2008/2009 turmoil. For this, financial companies should learn the CPI components defining the 
evolution of their stocks. 
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Table 5. Total debt as calculated from negative share prices. 
Company ## Shares Share price, $ Debt, $ 
LEH 6.89·108 -20 1.4·1010 
C 1.1·109 -30 3.3·1011 
CIT 8.12·109 -20 1.6·1011 
AIG 1.34·108 -360 1.0·1011 
FRE 6.8·108 -40 2.6·1010 
FNM 1.11·109 -50 5.5·1010 
 
Discussion 
A deterministic model has been developed for the prediction of stock prices at a horizon of several 
months. The model links the shares of traded companies to consumer price indices. In this paper, 
we presented empirical models for financial companies from the S&P 500 list. In May 2008, the 
model predicted negative share prices in the second half of 2008 for Lehman Brothers, American 
International Group, Freddie Mac. With known defining CPI components one could predict the 
approaching bankruptcies. This makes of crucial importance the estimation of correct empirical 
models, i.e. defining CPIs, for all shares. When reversed, the model also makes it is possible to 
predict the evolution of various CPI subcategories.  
Despite its apparent opposition to the mainstream concepts, the pricing model is deeply rooted 
in economics: a higher pricing power achieved by a given company should be converted into a 
faster growth in corresponding consumer price index. This link works excellent for many S&P 500 
companies. A further improvement in the model’s predictive power is likely possible using 
advanced methods of statistical and econometrical analysis.  However, one should bear in mind that 
the model will work until its influence on the market is negligible. When a good portion of market 
participants uses the model it should fail because the market functioning will be disturbed.  
Observed and predicted share prices are measured variables and the link between them is 
likely of a causal character during the studied period.  Therefore, the mainstream stock pricing 
models are, in part, valid – when the evolution of the driving force is random the price is also 
random, but predictable.  
An important possibility arises from our analysis. Using different subsets of the CPI, one can 
improve our tentative models for the studied companies, and easily obtain similar quantitative 
relationships for other companies. By extrapolating previously observed trends into the future, one 
may forecast share prices at various horizons. What likely is more important for a broader investor 
community, the proposed model also allows predicting the turning points between adjacent trends, 
when share prices are subject to a substantial decline.  
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The presented results are preliminary ones and do not pretend to provide an optimal price 
prediction. A comprehensive investigation with smaller components of the CPI will likely give 
superior results. So, we recommend refining the model in order to obtain accurate quantitative 
results for actual investment strategies.   All in all, the lagged differences between two CPI 
components provide a good approximation for the evolution of many stock prices.  
 One may pose a question: Why did the researches in economics and finances fail to derive 
the model many years ago? The answer is a scientific one. There were no appropriate data. First, the 
partition of the headline CPI in hundreds of components is a very new development. Moreover, this 
process is ongoing and a researcher obtains a more adequate set of defining variables. This brings 
both higher resolution and reliability. Second, the reliability critically depends on the dynamic 
range of data. The crisis of 2008 and 2009 has resulted in a dramatic change in both share prices 
and CPI components. The increased resolution and dynamic range allowed deriving a sound 
quantitative model. There was no chance to find the link between the share prices and CPI before 
the data allow. This is a general consideration applicable to all economic and financial models – 
adequate data must come first (Kitov, 2009a).    
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Appendix 1. List of seventy CPI components used in the study; in alphabetic order 
 
Acronym Description Acronym Description 
A apparel MAP men's and boy's apparel 
AB alcoholic beverages MCC medical care commodities 
APL appliances MCS medical care services 
C CPI MEAT meats, poultry, and fish 
CC core CPI MF motor fuel 
CE CPI less energy MISG miscelleneous goods 
CF CPI less food MISS miscellenous services 
CFSH CPI less food and shelter MVI motor vehicle insurance 
CFSHE CPI less food shelter and energy MVP motor vehicle parts 
CM CPI less medcare MVR motor vehicle repaire 
CO communication NC new cars 
COMM commodities NDUR nondurables 
CSH CPI less shelter O other goods and services 
DIAR diary products ORG other recreation goods 
DUR durables OS other services 
E energy PC personal care 
EC education and communication PDRUG prescription drugs 
ED education PETS pets and related goods 
F food and beverages R recreation 
FB food less beverages RENT rent  
FISH fish RPR rent primary residence 
FOOT footware RRM recreational reading materials 
FOTO photography RS recreation services 
FRUI fruits and vegetables SEFV food away from home 
FS financial services SERV services 
FU fuels and utilities (housing) SH shelter 
H housing SPO sporting goods (apparel) 
HFO household furnishing and operations T transportation 
HO household operations TOB tobacco 
HOSP hospital services TPR private transportation 
HS housekeeping supplies TPU public transportation 
ITR intracity transportation TS transportation services 
JEW jewelry and watches TUIT tuition 
LS legal services VAA video and audio 
M medical care WAP women's and girl's apparel 
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Appendix 2. Empirical 2-C models for S&P 500 financial companies 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d σ, $ 
AIG -191.36 SEFV 1 38.53 PDRUG 13 727.81 21166.78 92.31 
C 2.94 HO 5 -8.26 SEFV 2 36.70 1048.90 2.53 
CB -1.27 F 3 -0.41 O -3 16.53 313.52 1.70 
CINF -0.06 TOB -3 -2.79 SEFV -4 21.53 486.92 1.41 
CME -38.62 PETS 0 -30.86 AB 10 458.48 8475.35 41.43 
EQR -3.16 SEFV 3 1.12 PDRUG 4 11.48 187.90 2.14 
FHN 1.52 MCC 8 -4.10 SEFV -5 14.30 340.70 1.90 
FII 1.49 HO 12 -1.78 PETS 2 4.02 38.95 2.01 
HCBK 0.03 E 1 0.47 MISS -2 -4.43 -113.67 0.83 
HCP 1.31 MCC 5 0.30 FS -1 -8.35 -365.78 2.10 
HES 3.37 CSH -2 3.81 MISS -5 -47.75 -1480.90 4.87 
HIG 0.53 TPU 12 -8.35 PETS 1 44.41 741.76 4.79 
HST -1.30 FB 4 -1.39 RPR 11 18.91 451.01 1.12 
IVZ 2.44 HO 11 -1.52 PETS 3 -1.04 -99.66 1.79 
JNS -2.99 PETS 2 3.14 RPR 7 -4.93 -257.86 2.63 
KEY -0.36 DIAR 9 -3.92 RPR 11 28.68 763.73 1.59 
KIM 3.15 RS -3 -5.14 SEFV 2 25.07 454.58 2.17 
LNC -4.59 F 5 -2.35 TS 3 41.28 1212.45 3.80 
LUK 0.65 TPR -2 -1.42 MVI 3 7.66 332.12 3.13 
MCO -0.95 MEAT 4 -8.58 RPR 9 69.27 1664.39 3.90 
MET 0.36 TPU 13 -4.41 PETS 2 26.48 364.93 2.88 
MI -2.54 SEFV 4 -2.44 RPR 13 32.35 850.83 1.64 
MS 5.27 HO 8 -9.75 SEFV 2 39.55 1031.57 3.72 
MTB -3.96 FB 3 -4.65 RPR 11 57.08 1510.23 4.87 
NTRS -3.02 PETS 2 3.66 RPR 5 -5.16 -340.09 3.94 
PBCT 0.65 MCC 7 -0.75 MVP 13 0.12 -82.64 0.77 
PCL -0.81 MCC -1 0.57 FS -2 5.27 79.01 2.02 
PFG -3.01 PETS -2 0.97 FS -2 14.95 85.06 3.55 
PGR 0.13 FU -2 -1.74 RPR 2 11.47 309.11 1.29 
PLD -3.09 PETS -1 1.17 FS -2 14.18 42.98 3.44 
PRU -8.13 PETS 2 0.18 TOB 0 45.25 723.38 5.44 
RF -1.29 F -3 -2.04 FB 7 18.09 554.44 1.48 
SLM 1.91 PETS 13 -9.31 RPR 12 53.36 1490.40 4.12 
SPG -5.78 F 3 0.98 FS -1 38.82 693.54 5.36 
STI -5.70 FB 4 -0.16 TOB 5 37.05 1010.63 3.65 
STT 5.12 HO 11 -4.61 PETS 4 3.78 -50.41 5.02 
TMK -8.45 SEFV 3 0.77 HOSP 2 36.15 1140.20 3.24 
TROW -1.54 FB 3 -2.09 TS 5 26.41 644.30 3.51 
UNM -0.17 FU 6 -0.91 PETS 2 8.82 110.67 1.56 
USB -1.10 FB 4 0.32 FS 0 6.26 117.85 1.67 
VTR 0.45 FS -2 -1.60 MISS 8 18.93 276.81 2.41 
WFC -1.15 O -3 0.09 TOB 0 10.72 281.54 2.06 
XL -13.65 RPR 13 6.35 MVR 13 45.24 1413.75 4.37 
ZION -2.19 F 4 -8.09 RPR 13 67.14 1812.98 3.21 
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Appendix 3. Observed and predicted stock prices of S&P 500 financial companies 
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Appendix 4. Empirical models, as of May 2008. 
 
Company b1 CPI1 τ1 b2 CPI2 τ2 c d 
CB -0.39 FISH 8 -2.48 RS 13 17.32 335.17 
CINF -2.09 F 8 -3.41 PC 1 27.78 906.09 
CME 6.79 TOB 6 -169.02 SEFV 6 1014.46 23534.41 
EQR 3.33 MVP 5 -5.53 RPR 6 31.91 670.54 
FHN -6.62 SEFV 4 1.02 PDRUG 8 25.99 810.51 
FII 2.27 DUR 10 -1.54 HS 1 11.38 -48.93 
HCBK 0.07 TOB 13 -0.25 PDRUG 9 3.12 45.50 
HCP 4.91 R 5 0.94 OS 3 -9.23 -713.62 
HES -7.91 HO 5 17.05 SEFV 9 -44.26 -1925.87 
HIG -5.74 RPR 7 2.65 PDRUG 13 17.33 307.40 
IVZ -0.46 MEAT 7 -0.39 MVI 4 8.04 181.92 
JNS 1.14 DUR 11 -2.97 FOTO 5 -4.86 183.10 
KEY -3.14 RPR 6 0.98 PDRUG 11 11.84 304.61 
KIM 0.98 PDRUG 6 2.00 FOTO 11 0.13 -496.62 
LNC 3.12 MVP 4 -10.95 SEFV 4 61.51 1455.18 
LUK -4.26 VAA 8 1.74 OS 13 -5.82 46.26 
MCO 3.69 DUR 9 -9.51 RPR 8 75.41 1232.98 
MET -1.56 SH 11 1.13 PDRUG 12 4.74 -22.58 
MI -0.86 FB 3 -5.19 SEFV 4 37.48 979.40 
MTB -7.20 RPR 11 -3.57 MISS 12 87.49 2180.14 
NTRS -1.10 MEAT 8 0.45 DIAR 2 11.12 102.13 
PBCT -0.73 O 3 0.38 PDRUG 7 4.68 81.62 
PCL -0.22 FU 6 -0.16 TPU 0 7.81 59.81 
PFG 1.57 APL 3 6.50 FOTO 13 25.34 -840.96 
PGR 0.40 MVI 9 1.45 RRM 12 -5.52 -368.27 
PLD -2.16 FB 4 -1.02 FS 13 26.75 547.08 
PRU 2.00 PDRUG 13 -1.65 HOSP 4 31.56 -71.92 
RF -3.31 RPR 13 -1.89 RRM 3 25.57 967.64 
SLM 4.67 VAA 12 -6.52 RPR 13 41.17 706.86 
SPG 15.04 R 5 -5.63 PETS 3 24.43 -1021.99 
STI -8.07 SEFV 0 1.57 PDRUG 11 35.94 893.58 
STT -3.79 SERV 11 5.71 HO 11 8.40 131.84 
TMK 1.22 MCC 8 0.59 ITR 8 -9.63 -348.07 
TROW 1.54 EC 0 0.75 PDRUG 13 -4.58 -370.49 
UNM -1.09 FB 4 -0.84 MCC 4 14.36 374.29 
USB -0.04 E 1 -1.23 MISS 12 15.68 307.26 
VTR 1.04 MCC 4 0.85 FS 10 -7.35 -430.76 
WFC -1.62 F 13 -1.38 FB 0 18.21 491.21 
XL -2.86 O 12 2.95 PDRUG 11 -14.86 19.28 
ZION -3.22 AB 3 -7.99 RPR 13 70.08 1989.05 
 
